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Software vulnerabilitiesMany security incidents are caused by software developers’ failure to adhere to secure program-
ming practices. Static analysis tools have been used to detect software vulnerabilities. However,
their wide usage by developers is limited by the special training required to write rules custom-
ized to application-speciﬁc logic. Our approach is interactive static analysis, to integrate static
analysis into Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and provide in-situ secure program-
ming support to help developers prevent vulnerabilities during code construction. No additional
training is required nor are there any assumptions on ways programs are built. Our work is
motivated in part by the observation that many vulnerabilities are introduced due to failure
to practice secure programming by knowledgeable developers. We implemented a prototype
interactive static analysis tool as a plug-in for Java in Eclipse. Our technical evaluation of
our prototype detected multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in a large open source project. Our
evaluations also suggest that false positives may be limited to a very small class of use cases.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
Many computer security problems are caused by software
vulnerabilities, software ﬂaws that can be exploited by attack-
ers and result in data and ﬁnancial loss as well as inconve-
nience to customers. There are many causes for such
vulnerabilities, but the most common ones are ﬂaws intro-
duced by developers during program construction. A number
of vulnerabilities can be addressed with relatively straightfor-
ward coding practices, referred to as secure programming [1],such as performing validation on user input to prevent vari-
ous forms of injection attacks. While there are a number of
programming practices and libraries to help prevent vulnera-
bilities, developers must remember to utilize them, and do so
correctly.
While secure programming practices have been well docu-
mented [2–6], developers continue to make the same mistakes.
For example, in 2011 Veracode analyzed over 6750 web appli-
cation builds across 40 different industry sections. A third of
these applications had SQL injection vulnerabilities which
had been documented over a decade ago and could be simply
addressed by parameterized SQL statements [7]. The vast
majority of vulnerabilities found in the Veracode study were
caused by ignoring proper secure programming practices and
could be corrected relatively easily.
The most commercially successful method of detecting
security vulnerabilities in code is through static analysis (e.g.
1. protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,  HttpServletResponse response) 
throws ServletException, IOException { 
2.       try { 
3.             String title = request.getParameter("title");         //taint source
4.            String content = request.getParameter("content");    //taint source
5.            Timestamp pubTime = new Timestamp(new Date().getTime()); 
6.            String author = null; 
7.            String validatedTitle = Util.developerDefinedValidationMethod(title);   //user-
defined validation routine
8.            String validatedContent = Util.developerDefinedValidationMethod(content);   
//user-defined validation routine
9.            HttpSession session = request.getSession(); 
10.            User loggedInUser = (User) session.getAttribute("LoggedInUser"); 
11.            if (loggedInUser != null) {   //access control check
12.                 if (loggedInUser.isAuthorizedToAuthor()) {   //access control check
13.                     author = loggedInUser.getUsername(); 
14.                     //sink & sensitive operation
15.                     DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry(author, validatedTitle, validatedContent, 
pubTime);  
16.                  }else { 
17.                     ActionErrors errors = new ActionErrors(); 
18.                     errors.add(null, new ActionError("error.permissions.deniedSave")); 
19.                     saveErrors(request, errors); 
20.                  } 
21.             } else { 
22.                response.sendRedirect("Login"); 
23.             } 
24.           } catch (Exception e) { 
25.              ActionErrors errors = new ActionErrors(); 
26.              errors.add(null, new ActionError("error.permissions.deniedSave")); 
27.              saveErrors(request, errors);}} 
Fig. 1 Entry method doPost().
450 J. Zhu et al.Fortify SCA [8], Veracode [9], and Coverity [10]). However,
these tools require special training and often are not used by
regular developers, thus requiring additional steps in the soft-
ware development process to ﬁnd and remove vulnerabilities.
Performing static analysis effectively to detect software vulner-
abilities often requires application-speciﬁc knowledge for sev-
eral reasons. First, static analysis often generates many false
positive warnings. For example, default rules in static analysis
tools warn developers to validate untrusted input, regardless of
whether proper input validation code has been added. To sup-
press these warnings in cases when input validation functions
have been provided, customized rules must be written by peo-
ple knowledgeable in using static analysis tools as well as
understanding application-speciﬁc logic. Second, applications
often must satisfy certain security invariants, e.g. access con-
trol rules. Such invariants are by nature application-speciﬁc.
Again customized rules must be written in order for static
analysis tools to detect missing security invariants. As a result,
using static analysis to detect software vulnerabilities can be
expensive in practice because it requires close collaborations
between software developers and software security specialists
trained to use static analysis tools. The full beneﬁt of using sta-
tic analysis to detect software vulnerabilities is often not real-
ized because of this high cost.
Programmer errors, including security ones, are unavoid-
able even for well-trained programmers. One major cause of
programming mistakes is software developer’s heavy cognitive
load dealing with a multitude of issues, such as functional
requirements, runtime performance, deadlines, and security
[11–13]. Consider Donald Knuth’s analysis of 867 software er-
rors he made while writing TEX [14]. It is clear from his error
log that some of these errors could have made TEX vulnerable
to security breaches. The following quotes illustrate Knuth’s
experience of heavy cognitive burden as a major source of soft-
ware errors:
‘‘Here I did not remember to do everything I had intended
when I actually got around to writing a particular part of
the code. It was a simple error of omission, rather than com-
mission. . . This seems to be one of my favorite mistakes: I
often forget the most obvious things’’ [14].
We believe that by providing helpful warnings to developers
in-situ and gathering application-speciﬁc knowledge from them,
during their programming tasks, we can more easily detect and
resolve security vulnerabilities. In this paper we describe per-
forming interactive static analysis on patterns of code leading
to vulnerabilities, and reminding and assisting developers in
resolving them within their development environment. We will
demonstrate and validate our approach with a prototype imple-
mentation. The most important beneﬁt of our approach is a
mantra for software development: ﬁnding and ﬁxing problems
earlier in the development life cycle is less costly and less time
consuming. In addition, by interacting with those most familiar
with the application-speciﬁc context, the analysis techniques can
be more focused and customized to that context.Overview of interactive static analysis
We provide an overview of interactive static analysis using the
motivating example illustrated in Fig. 1. It is a code snippet
adapted from a Java servlet-based weblog managementapplication. Method doPost() is one of the entry points of this
application. It creates a weblog entry. In a typical default
security rule set for static analysis in Java, API request.get
Parameter(), as used on line 3 and line 4 is designated as a
taint source, as it reads in untrusted input. Database operation
APIs, such as statement.executeUpdate(), are designated as
a data ﬂow sink, as it modiﬁes the database. Many
such database operation APIs are privileged operations and
require access control checks before invocation. Because
method call DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry() used on line 15
calls statement.executeUpdate() in its implementation,
DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry() may be considered as a data
ﬂow sink as well as being a privileged operation. Good secure
programming practice calls for all input parameters to this
method be validated and access control checks must be
provided.
Secure programming with interactive static analysis 451Applying static analysis to this program, one may ﬁnd two
issues. First, untrusted inputs are propagated from the data
ﬂow taint sources on line 3 and line 4 to the data ﬂow sink
on line 15, making the code vulnerable to injection attacks.
These cases can be found easily by most static analyzers using
default security rules. However, in this case, they are false pos-
itives as input validations have been performed on lines 7 and
8. To suppress these false positives, customized rules must be
written. Second, there exists an execution path from the entry
method doPost() on line 1 to a privileged operation
DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry() on line 15. If an access control
check is not performed, there would be a broken access control
vulnerability. Performing this type of static analysis requires
intimate knowledge of the application logic and is typically
not performed by default in static analysis tools.
Our approach can support vulnerability detection by the
developer by integrating static analysis into the Integrated
Development Environment (IDE) as a plug-in, facilitating
the two-way interaction between static analysis and the devel-
opers. Plug-in to Developer: the plug-in analyzes the source
code in the background and reminds developers about vulner-
able code through instant security warnings in-situ. Developers
could interact with the warnings, get the contextual explana-
tions about the vulnerable code, and resolve them with the
assistance from the plug-in. Developer to plug-in: the developer
is prompted by the plug-in and asked to identify and annotate
application-speciﬁc logic critical for security, which we named
interactive code annotation [15]. The annotations are then lev-
eraged to perform additional static analysis, which helps dis-
cover vulnerabilities and reduces false positives without the
intervention by someone with special training in static analysis
to write customized rules.
Developers are not required to have any knowledge of sta-
tic analysis, nor are they security experts. However, they do
have to be familiar with basic security concepts (e.g. access
control, encryption) as well as basic secure programming tech-
niques (e.g. input validation, prepared SQL statements). We
assume interactive support for secure programming occurs in
the context of an organization which values secure program-
ming and wants to support sharing secure programmingFig. 2 ASIDE identiﬁes sensitive method calls while developersknowledge and standards among development teams. An
interactive static analysis tool can be conﬁgured by an organi-
zation’s software security group (SSG), which is responsible
for ensuring software security as identiﬁed by best industry
practice [16]. Thus, the SSG could use interactive static analy-
sis to communicate and promote organizational and/or appli-
cation-speciﬁc programming standards. For example, an SSG
may list operations that are considered privileged (e.g. insert-
ing a weblog into the database) and that the application must
provide an access control check. Another beneﬁt of an interac-
tive static analysis tool is that it can provide logs of how secu-
rity considerations were addressed during program
construction, which are very valuable information for more
effective code review and auditing.
Our prototype implementation of interactive static analysis,
ASIDE (Application Security in IDE) is a plug-in for Java in
Eclipse. ASIDE is driven by a set of security speciﬁcations
describing patterns of code that may be of concern from a se-
cure programming perspective. This speciﬁcation language can
be used by a SSG with little special training. For example, one
can specify database tables and operations that require access
control checks (e.g. inserting into the weblog table), or an API
that reads untrusted data. ASIDE continuously monitors
changes in the Eclipse workspace to detect these code patterns.
Much of the static analysis task can be performed incremen-
tally by a separate background thread and thus will not block
the developer from normal code editing or other interactions
with the IDE.
When a speciﬁed code pattern is detected, developers are gi-
ven in-situ warnings of potential vulnerabilities alongside the
code they are working on, as well as optional explanations
and suggestions to resolve those vulnerabilities. Fig. 2 shows
a screenshot of the motivating example within Eclipse, in
which method invocation DBUtil.updateblogEntry() on line
37 is highlighted in red and ﬂagged with an ASIDE warning
because this method updates the weblog. By highlighting this
method, ASIDE is requesting that the developer annotate
the code performing the access control check for this privileged
operation. The annotation can be completed entirely with intu-
itive mouse-based point-and-clicks. Hovering over theare writing code, it reminds the developer through warnings.
Fig. 3 Developer is instructed to annotate access control logic for the highlighted sensitive method call on line 37.
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explanation of what is requested with an optional link to read
more explanations. A developer can dismiss the warning with
the option ‘‘Click me to remove this warning’’ if he considers
the warning as a false positive.
By selecting the option of ‘‘Click me to annotate a control
logic’’ the developer can highlight code that performs access
control for this database operation. The annotated code will
be highlighted in green, the ﬂag with the warned sensitive oper-
ation will turn light brown, and the highlighting color will turn
to yellow, as shown in Fig. 4. In this case the access control
check involves two Boolean tests: (a) checking to make sure
a user is logged in and (b) the user has the right to write to this
particular weblog.Fig. 4 After annotating the control logic in lines 34, 35 with a greKey design issues for interactive annotation include the fol-
lowing: (a) Where to prompt the developer for annotation, and
(b) what are the characteristics of acceptable annotations.
Requesting annotation at the place where privileged opera-
tions are invoked may not always be the best place. For exam-
ple, a utility method may be written to update an account
balance. This utility method may be utilized by different use
cases (e.g. ‘‘fee payment’’ and ‘‘fund transfer’’). Requesting
annotation for access control logic for updating the balance
may not provide adequate application context (e.g. ‘‘fund
transfer’’ may require two factor authentication for example).
A much more reasonable point of annotation is at the top level
of a use case. In the context of web applications, a use case is
most likely to correspond to a web entry method. Therefore, inen annotation, line 37 turned yellow from the original red ﬂag.
Secure programming with interactive static analysis 453the illustrated example above, the request for annotation is
presented at the level of the web entry method doPost(). The
warning is placed beside a method call, DBUtil.updateblogEn-
try() on line 37 in Fig. 2. This method invocation indirectly
performs the privileged operation.
Acceptable annotations must satisfy the following require-
ments. First, they must consist of a set of logical assertions
(Boolean expressions in if statements, cases in switch state-
ments, or program assertions), or method invocations. Second,
the annotated code must be on the execution path from the en-
try method to the warned sensitive operation. In our running
example, all annotations are Boolean expressions as illustrated
on lines 34, 35 in Fig. 4.
Interactive annotation could also be used to request anno-
tation for validation or sanitization routines in addition to ac-
cess control logic. For example, in the motivating example of
Fig. 1, the developer will be prompted on line 15,
DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry(author, validatedTitle, validated-
Content, pubTime), and asked to annotate validation routines
for the parameters used in the method call. In this case, the
developer performs input validation on lines 7 and 8, so he
is expected to annotate the method calls Util.developerDeﬁned-
ValidationMethod(title) and Util.developerDeﬁnedValidation
Method(content).
To summarize, our interactive static analysis framework
generally aims to address two major categories of vulnerabili-
ties: lack of enforcing security invariants and lack of sanitiza-
tion of untrusted data. Our approach as described above can
address seven out of OWASP Top Ten web application vulner-
abilities [17]: Injection, Cross-Site Scripting, Unvalidated
Redirects and Forwards, which are all caused by lack of sani-
tization of untrusted data; Broken Authentication, Insecure
Direct Object Reference, CSRF, and Missing Functional Level
Access Control which are all caused by lack of enforcing secu-
rity invariants.
Prototype implementation and evaluation
In the previous section, we illustrated the interactive static
analysis framework with a code example and our prototype
implementation, ASIDE. In this section, we will ﬁrst describe
the underlying static analysis mechanism we implemented in
ASIDE, called path coverage static analysis, and then describe
a set of evaluations we performed.
Path coverage static analysis
The focus of our static analysis component is on detecting vul-
nerabilities originating from improper untrusted data handling
and failure to maintain security invariants. Improper untrusted
data handling means that untrusted data is propagated to data
ﬂow sinks without sanitization. Failure to maintain security
invariants means program execution could reach security-sen-
sitive operation on the control ﬂow path without checking
security invariants. A common characteristic for both catego-
ries of vulnerabilities is that proper security requirements are
not enforced on at least one execution path. Therefore our sta-
tic analysis mechanism addresses what we refer to as the ‘‘path
coverage problem’’: security requirements, data sanitization or
security invariant checks must be enforced on all execution
paths in a coherent manner. We will ﬁrst introduce a few con-cepts and deﬁnitions used in our path coverage analysis, and
then describe the path coverage analysis with examples.
Path: An execution path from a program entry point to a
particular operation of interest. Algorithms for enumerating
execution paths have been well studied.
Security entry point: One of the two points in a program: (1)
entry point of a program, e.g. doPost method, which is a com-
mon entry point for Java Servlet-based web applications; (2)
an API call where untrusted data is read into the program,
which is also referred to as a taint source.
Security sinks: Security-sensitive operations or events,
examples include accessing sensitive information (e.g. updating
a customer database table), or performing an operation that
requires authorization (e.g. switching a relay on a power grid).
Security path: A security path is an execution path with a
security entry point and a security sink.
Security path requirements: There are often security-related
requirements related to execution paths, such as sanitization of
untrusted data or enforcing security invariants. Security path
requirements are typically part of the software requirements.
For example, a web application must perform an access con-
trol check before updating the customer database table, and
must also perform checks to prevent CSRF attack against
updating the customer table. Note that security path require-
ments are always given with respect to security sinks.
Security code instance: In our approach code annotation re-
quests the developer to interactively annotate fragments of
code that fulﬁll security path requirements. We refer to these
code fragments as security code instances.
Generic principle of path coverage analysis: The generic
principle that guides our interactive static analysis is, for a gi-
ven security sink, there is at least one security code instance for
each security path leading to it.
We use the following running example of a Java-based on-
line banking application to illustrate the generic principle of
path coverage analysis. Suppose this application has three
database tables: user, account, and transaction. The application
consists of a set of use cases such as login, bill pay and view
transactions. Security sinks are accesses (read, write, delete,
or update) operations to one of these tables. We denote the
set of sinks as S. Security path requirements for this applica-
tion may include (a) all untrusted data involved in execution
paths to any of these sinks must be sanitized; (b) access control
must be performed on all execution paths leading to any of
these operations; (c) CSRF prevention must be provided for
insert, delete, or update operations on these tables.
Various expressions such as method invocations and Bool-
ean expressions could be used as security code instances to sat-
isfy security path requirements. At this stage of our work we
assume all the security invariants are enforced in the form of
Boolean expressions. For each sink s in S, there is a set of
Boolean expressions used to enforce security invariants I(s)
= {C1, . . .,Cn}. Each Ci is a Boolean expression. These expres-
sions are part of the conditions that determine security invari-
ants. For example, Fig. 5 shows a ﬂow chart representation of
a Java code fragment implementing access control to the up-
date operation on the account table. In this example, the sink,
s, is in the block ‘‘update account information,’’ highlighted in
yellow. I(s) consist of the set of Boolean expressions high-
lighted in green: ‘‘User authenticated’’, ‘‘User owns this ac-
count’’, and ‘‘User is an authorized bank employee’’. The
exact logic combinations of these Boolean expressions to
Fig. 5 Flow chart of Java code updating the account table.
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ﬂow.
For the example account update use case, enforced security
invariants to access customer accounts are either (a) the user is
logged in and the user is the owner of the account, or (b) the
user is logged in and the user is an appropriately authorized
bank employee. A key insight of the path coverage analysis ap-
proach is to detect conﬂicts in the way security invariants are
being checked along different execution paths in the same
application. These conﬂicts often lead to common security
vulnerabilities.
Input to path coverage static analysis is an application rep-
resented as a set of Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs), a set of
sinks S and a set of security entry points E. For each sink s
in S, the set of Boolean expressions enforcing security invari-
ants I(s) is obtained through interactive annotation.
The core of the path coverage analysis is to enumerate all
execution paths from entry points to sinks, and analyze anno-
tations along the paths. As an illustrative example, consider
the ﬂow chart in Fig. 5. In this case there are two execution
paths: (a) web-entryﬁ User-authenticatedﬁ User owns-ac-
countﬁ Update-account, and (b) web entryﬁ User authenti-
catedﬁ User-does-not-own-accountﬁ User-authorized-bank
employeeﬁ Update account. In this case no vulnerabilities are
detected because both execution paths are properly covered by
Boolean expressions of annotated security invariants.
To illustrate the path coverage analysis with our prototype
ASIDE, consider the motivating code example as shown in
Fig. 4 in section ‘Overview of interactive static analysis’, two
annotations (in green) have been made for the sink
DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry() (in yellow), and there exists only
one execution path from the entry point to the sink,
doPostﬁ loggedInUser != nullﬁ loggedInUser.isAuthorized
ToAuthor()ﬁ DBUtil.updateWeblogEntry(), on which there
exist two annotations, and thus no vulnerabilities are detected.We will further illustrate the path coverage analysis in sec-
tion ‘Effectiveness in detecting software vulnerabilities’, in
which we will illustrate how path coverage analysis is applied
to detect a broken access control vulnerability in a large open
source project.
Evaluations
Our evaluation of ASIDE consists of the following aspects.
First, we performed a technical evaluation with a large open
source project to demonstrate the effectiveness of interactive
annotation in detecting security vulnerabilities. Second, we
performed false positive analysis of interactive annotation with
a real-world web project. Third, we evaluated the complexity
of the code annotation task with a real-world web project
showing that the annotation task is a relatively small burden
for users. Finally we conducted an exploratory user study to
understand how developers may actually use ASIDE in the
ﬁeld.
Effectiveness in detecting software vulnerabilities
To evaluate the effectiveness of interactive static analysis in
detecting software vulnerabilities, we ran our prototype
ASIDE on Apache Roller [18], which is a widely used weblog
server open source project, and successfully discovered multi-
ple zero-day Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabili-
ties [19], which exist in all the released versions of Roller,
from 3.0 to 5.0. All the vulnerabilities were conﬁrmed by our
penetration testing as well as the Roller team. With our vulner-
ability report and resolution suggestions, the Roller develop-
ment team has released Apache Roller 5.0.1 with the security
ﬁx [20]. Among the multiple CSRF vulnerabilities found, we
choose one of them as an example to describe how interactive
static analysis worked.
Fig. 6 shows a code snippets of the method ActionForward
save() in org.apache.roller.ui.authoring.struts.actions.Weblog-
EntryFormAction.java from Apache Roller 3.0 [21]. Apache
Roller 3.0 uses the Apache Struts I framework, under which
the save() method is a web application entry point because
of object inheritance. This method handles requests of new
weblog entry creation. As shown in the Fig. 6, line 321 is high-
lighted with a red ﬂag security warning for weblogMgr.save-
WeblogEntry(entry) because it inserts a weblog entry into
the database. ASIDE is requesting the developer to annotate
program logic provided to check access control as well as pre-
vent Cross-site Request Forgery. In this case, the Boolean
expression rses.isUserAuthorizedToAuthor(site) || (rses.isUs-
erAuthorized(site) && !form.getStatus().equals(WeblogEntry-
Data.PUBLISHED)) on lines 261 and 262 provides access
control checks, but the developer is not able to locate and
annotate the CSRF protection check. Failing to identify CSRF
protection logic, the developer would have realized that a
CSRF protection check needs to be added.
In addition to the CSRF vulnerabilities, ASIDE also
detected an access control vulnerability in Apache Roller 3.1
[21], which has been conﬁrmed in the bug tracking history repos-
itory of Roller [22]. Fig. 7 shows the screenshots of three
methods that are related to the access control vulnerability.
Method doGet() in Fig. 7a is a web entry method that
handles all authentication web requests in Roller, in which it
calls Handler.getHandler(req) on line 50. Method Handler.
Fig. 6 CSRF code snippet of method save() in WeblogEntryFormAction.java.
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Fig. 7b. Method handler.processGet() on line 53 in Fig. 7a in-
vokes a privileged database query through a sequence ofmethod
calls. Method authenticate() in Fig. 7b calls the method verify-
User(username, password) on line 51, which is shown in Fig. 7c.
Thus there exist execution paths from the entry method do-
Get() on line 47 of Fig. 7a to privileged database queries.
ASIDE would ﬂag a warning on line 53 in Fig. 7a requesting
for annotation of control logic checks and also highlight the
code in red. Access control checks are provided in verifyUs-
er(username, password) by four Boolean expressions on lines
58, 61, 65, 68 as shown in Fig. 7c. Once the developer ﬁnishes
annotating these control checks, ASIDE detects that there ex-
ists an execution path from the entry method doGet() to the
sensitive operation handler.processGet() on line 53 in Fig. 7a
without any annotated control checks on it, and thus reports
an access control vulnerability. The vulnerability originates
from the control ﬂow in the method authenticate() shown in
Fig. 7b. The access control checks are performed in method
verifyUser(username, password) which is called on line 51 in
Fig. 7b. However, once the Boolean expressions st.hasMoreTo-
kens() on line 42 or basic.equalsIgnoreCase(‘‘Basic’’)) on line
44 is FALSE, the execution will not reach the method call ver-
ifyUser(userName, password) on line 51, and thus no anno-
tated control checks will be executed, which leads to an
access control vulnerability.
False positive for interactive annotation
We performed evaluation of false positives of interactive static
analysis on Tunestore, a web application developed by a pro-
fessional developer for our department’s web application
development curriculum. It is written in Java using the Apache
Struts I framework. It provides basic functionality of an online
music store. A user can view all available songs in the store
with or without logging in. Registered users can comment on
songs, purchase songs and send gifts to friends.Under Struts I every use case is implemented by an org.apa-
che.struts.action Action class. For instance, the login function-
ality is implemented by class LoginAction.java. Each Action
class has an execute() method serving as an entry point for
the web application. Database operations are implemented
with Java SQL APIs. ASIDE identiﬁed 24 cases where an entry
point is able to reach a sensitive database operation on a con-
trol ﬂow path. For example, Fig. 8 shows a screenshot of class
LoginAction.java. On line 55 method execute() calls stmt.exe-
cuteQuery(sql), a method that retrieves the username and
password from the database. Since reading user information
is a sensitive operation, ASIDE requests that the developer
annotate the code for the access control check.
A false positive is a case where ASIDE requests annotation
of access control logic where in reality access control is not
necessary. The login case illustrated above is an example of a
false positive because there will be no access control check
for the login function. We manually inspected all 24 requests
for annotation by ASIDE and identiﬁed 5 cases as false posi-
tives, as shown in Table 1. Use cases for Login and Registra-
tion each include two database operations. All false positives
are involved with use cases such as login, logout and registra-
tion, in which accessing the sensitive users table does not re-
quire access control, since these are starting points where
users will be granted access rights.
The false positive rate of (5/24) should be viewed in the con-
text of the application. Tunestore is a small web applicationwith
only 16 use cases including login, logout, and registration. If the
pattern we observed here, that false positives for access control
annotation are limited to a small class of use cases (login, logout
and registration), is conﬁrmed in large web applications with
many more use cases, false positive rates would be much lower.
Complexity of the annotation task
For interactive annotation to work, a developer must be able
to easily identify code in response to annotations requested
Fig. 7 Apache Roller 3.1 vulnerable code screenshots.
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approximate the annotation complexity of the annotation
task. It is based on the distance between the location whereannotation is requested and the location of the code in re-
sponse to the annotation request. The intuition is that the lar-
ger this distance, the more effort a developer must spend to
Fig. 8 Tunestore Login Action Servlet.
Secure programming with interactive static analysis 457search and look for the appropriate place to make an
annotation.
Speciﬁcally AD equals to one when the annotated code can
be found in the same method where the annotation is re-
quested (the warning is displayed). AD equals to two in cases
where code to be annotated can be found in another method
within the same class as where annotation is requested. AD
equals to 3 when the code to be annotated can be found in an-
other class within the same package as where annotation is re-
quested. AD equals to 4 when the code to be annotated can be
found in another package. In cases where multiple annotations
are made to a request (e.g. in the motivating example, there are
two Boolean expressions in response to the request for annota-
tion of access control logic), the corresponding AD is the sum
of ADs for each annotation given.
We measured the AD score for each of the 19 positive cases
identiﬁed by ASIDE in Tunestore. Some of them already have
the appropriate checks implemented in code while the rest do
not. Again as mentioned earlier for those cases where the
developer cannot ﬁnd the code to annotate, the annotation
process will help developers to discover and prevent broken
access controls by reminding them to implement that code.
Table 2 shows the result of applying the distance metric to
the 19 true positives.
All 19 cases require a user to login and maintain an active
session. Tunestore enforces this type of access control check in
the same method as where the annotation is requested, thus,
AD is one. In addition to checking whether the current session
is active, ten cases need CSRF protection check, shown in the
last column of Table 2. Tunestore does not provide anydefense against CSRF, thus the developer would need to write
the corresponding defense code in these ten cases, and then
may annotate the checks for corresponding paths.
There is one case, viewing of songs, where AD is 4. The
annotation request will be prompted on line 21 of ListAc-
tion.java as shown in Fig. 9, DBUtil.getCDsForUser(. . .),
which contains database operations that require an access con-
trol check. This method is declared in a different package and
thus according to our deﬁnition the AD is 4.
Our evaluation of Tunestore suggests that the annotation
complexity of interactive annotation may be modest for web-
based applications. Most access control logic checks are within
the same class as where annotation is requested. These checks,
however, are not of a direct and uniform format such as a
Boolean conditional tests. Other forms of logic tests include
WHERE clause of a SQL statement. ASIDE has implemented
the most intuitive checks, which are conditional tests that are
often implemented as Boolean test. ASIDE needs to be further
enhanced to support annotation of other types of logic checks.
Developer behavior
Next we want to understand how developers actually behave in
response to a request of interactive annotation. Because there
are a large number of potential factors involved, we conducted
an exploratory user study with the speciﬁc purpose of under-
standing critical variables to help us design more focused user
studies in the future. Our exploratory study seeks to answer the
following questions. (a) Even though most annotations can be
found within the same method, can developers easily identify
them? (b) If developers were NOT able to annotate correct
Table 1 Five false positive cases of ASIDE’s analysis results on Tunestore.
Use case Path Reason
Entry point Sensitive operation
Login LoginAction.java:34:execute(. . .) LoginAction.java:55:executeQuery(. . .) Application logic does not require access control
LoginAction.java:34:execute(. . .) LoginAction.java:77:executeUpdate(. . .)
Logout LogoutAction.java:29:execute(. . .) LogoutAction.java:41:executeUpdate(. . .)
Registration RegisterAction.java:29:execute(. . .) RegisterAction.java:56:executeUpdate(. . .)
RegisterAction.java:29:execute(. . .) RegisterAction.java:65:executeUpdate(. . .)
458 J. Zhu et al.control logic, what were the major difﬁculties/obstacles pre-
venting them from doing so? And (c) How can we improve
ASIDE’s user interaction to better serve developers?
Our exploratory study observed student participants using
ASIDE on functioning web applications, each with a number
of vulnerabilities. We asked all participants to think aloud
while they were reviewing source code in Eclipse with ASIDE
warnings. During the observation, we also asked participants
questions whenever we found an action worth further probing.
We recorded all screens as well as conversations with partici-
pants for data analysis.
We recruited 8 student volunteers from 3 different sources.
Three of them were from a web development course in our col-
lege. Two were from a web security course, which aims to
teach students ethical hacking and secure programming. The
other 3 students were from a highly selective security scholar-
ship program at the college. Participants were at different
experience levels with respect to web development and secure
programming. The 3 from the web development course were
the least experienced in programming with no prior exposure
to secure programming. The 2 from the secure programming
course were more experienced in programming, and were in
the process of acquiring secure programming knowledge.
The 3 from the scholarship program were constantly being ex-
posed to a variety of security-related projects. In addition to
being immersed in software security, all three of them had ta-
ken the secure web application course in current or prior
semesters. All participants were ﬁrst time users of ASIDE.
For the 3 participants recruited from the web development
course, they worked on an online stock trading system, a project
that is part of their course assignment. The rest of the participants
worked onTunestore described earlier. Prior to the study, the lat-
ter group of 5 students already had knowledge of Tunestore since
they had been asked to ﬁnd and ﬁx certain vulnerabilities in it.We
chose Tunestore for this latter group of participants because we
wanted to simulate the environment where developers work on
projects they are very familiar with. Even though this group of
developers knew some security vulnerabilities in Tunestore, it
was still their ﬁrst experience with ASIDE.
We gave an introduction of ASIDE to all participants on a
sample web application by addressing a warning through the 3
different options provided by ASIDE as shown in Figs. 2–4:
read more about this warning; annotate a control logic; re-
move this warning. Then, we imported the participant’s project
into a new workspace of Eclipse, and started screen and voice
recordings. We let participants examine annotation requests
shown in his/her code. Each session lasted from 30 to 40 min.
Our ﬁndings indicate that in order for a developer to pro-
vide the correct annotation, he/she must ﬁrst understand andappreciate the underlying problem. In other words the devel-
oper must be able to understand why it is important to provide
the annotation. The approach we provided to convey this
information to the developer, an explanation web page, may
not be adequate for some developers. We extracted three char-
acteristics that heavily inﬂuenced participant behavior from
our observations.
Attacker mentality
Having an established attacker mentality, the mindset of manip-
ulating an application to perform unintended functions, is
strongly correlated with performance of the annotation task.
The three participants with limited understand of security and
penetration testing failed to comprehend annotation requests.
Moreover, none of them were able to identify whether a warning
is a true positive or a false positive, or give any judgment as to
whether the tool makes sense. For instance, participant P1 said:
[P1] I don’t know what this user.isPrivileged() means.
When asked whether she read the provided web page mate-
rial explaining broken access control problems, participant P2
responded that she did read through it. Yet when confronted
to explain what is the problem described in the page, she mur-
mured and then switched the topic of discussion.
Participant P3 glanced quickly through the explanatory
page explaining broken access control, but found no informa-
tion that was relevant to his code. He dismissed the page as a
result. He then failed to identify whether a warning was indi-
cating a real vulnerability or not. He also failed to give reasons
why he thought a warning was a false positive.
In contrast, the other 5 participants, who either had been or
were taking a course on penetration testing and attacking/
breaking web applications by exploiting code level vulnerabil-
ities were able to make a quick and accurate decision on the
false positives on both the login servlet and register servlet.
Three of them succeeded in identifying lack of access control
before changing an existing user’s password, while the other
two were able to realize the issue after we mentioned the pos-
sibility of broken access control.
Knowledge of attacks
We ﬁnd that knowledge of the attacks is another factor inﬂu-
encing developer understanding of annotation requests. For
instance, someone who understands broken access control
may not understand Cross-site Request Forgery and therefore
not be able to provide annotation of code preventing
Table 2 Complexity of annotating for Tunestore.
Use case Path Annotation
distance
Required
check(s)
Entry point Sensitive operation
Change Password PasswordAction.java:31:execute(. . .) PasswordAction.java:58:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
Add Balance AddBalanceAction.java:56:execute(. . .) AddBalanceAction.java:93:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
Purchase a Song BuyAction.java:32:execute(. . .) BuyAction.java:73:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
BuyAction.java:32:execute(. . .) BuyAction.java:90:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
BuyAction.java:32:execute(. . .) BuyAction.java:97:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
Comment a Song LeaveCommentAction.java:30:execute(. . .) LeaveCommentAction.java:46:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
Add a friend AddFriendAction.java:32:execute(. . .) AddFriendAction.java:45:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
AddFriendAction.java:32:execute(. . .) AddFriendAction.java:57:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
AddFriendAction.java:32:execute(. . .) AddFriendAction.java:77:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
View Friends FriendsAction.java:33:execute(. . .) FriendsAction.java:45:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
FriendsAction.java:33:execute(. . .) FriendsAction.java:65:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
Gift Setup GiftSetupAction.java:34:execute(. . .) GiftSetupAction.java:60:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
Gift a Friend GiveAction.java:32:execute(. . .) GiveAction.java:56:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
GiveAction.java:32:execute(. . .) GiveAction.java:74:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
GiveAction.java:32:execute(. . .) GiveAction.java:88:executeUpdate(. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
GiveAction.java:32:execute(. . .) GiveAction.java:98:executeUpdate (. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
GiveAction.java:32:execute(. . .) GiveAction.java:107:executeUpdate (. . .) 2 WHERE clause/CSRF check
Display Account Balance LeftAction.java:25:execute(. . .) LeftAction.java:34:executeQuery(. . .) 1 WHERE clause
View Songs for User ListAction.java:17:execute(. . .) DBUtil.java:110:executeQuery (. . .) 4 WHERE clause
Secure programming with interactive static analysis 459Cross-site Request Forgery. Among all 5 participants who
possessed an attacker mentality, none of them immediately
spotted the Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities
that were indicated by ASIDE warnings (part of the interview
records are shown in Table 3).
Once we explained further, through discussions, of CSRF
in the context of Tunestore, four out of the 5 participants suc-
cessfully annotated the corresponding prevention logic follow-
ing instructions provided by ASIDE.
Programming capability
Three of the 8 participants either had experience writing pro-
fessional code or were about to become a professional devel-
oper. They were able to perform ASIDE annotations
successfully and correctly on the ﬁrst try. When asked about
whether the phrase ‘‘Boolean control check’’ makes sense to
them, they responded positively. For instance, P8 (a profes-
sional developer) expressed with conﬁdence in the following
dialog:
[Investigator] Do you consider it being easy and intuitive to
ﬁnd the right check?Fig. 9 Method execute(. . .) in Lis[P8] I think so, I think if it’s your code and especially if this
system works for the purpose of designing for it, for instance,
if it’s identifying an issue here and I have to create a check in
order to verify the statement, I don’t think ﬁnding the Bool-
ean check is going to be the difﬁcult part at all.
In contrast, the rest of the participants had trouble locating
a Boolean control check for a warning even after they had been
given detailed description of the potential vulnerability. The
other 5 found it difﬁcult to accurately explain the phrase
‘‘Boolean control check’’.
Throughout the study, participants identiﬁed several user
interface issues that can be improved to help developers use
ASIDE more effectively. For example, (a) Highlight all Bool-
ean logic checks in the current active/visible editor view. The
current design requires users to look for and locate such code.
Our study shows that users have difﬁculty locating as well as
selecting the right code piece. (b) Attach the information pre-
sentation box to the cursor and have the box move along the
cursor. The current design has the information box sitting stat-
ically at the bottom right corner of the Eclipse window. It can
be easily overlooked since it is far away from the code the user
is focusing on.tAction.java in which AD is 4.
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tial to be useful for developers who are experienced in applica-
tion development and are aware of how security vulnerabilities
can lead to attacks. However, we need to carefully examine the
language ASIDE uses to communicate with developers to
make sure it is more broadly understandable. We also need
to explore how to provide additional awareness of security vul-
nerabilities for those who may have little knowledge of them so
they can also utilize ASIDE. Table 4 gives a summary of the
results from the study.
Related work
Programmer errors. Research on human errors [12] and pro-
grammer errors [11] suggests that these errors stem from three
types of cognitive breakdowns [13,23]: skill-based breakdowns
where programmers fail to perform routine actions at critical
times; rule-based breakdowns where programmer fail to include
required actions in a new context; and knowledge-based break-
downs where a programmer’s knowledge is insufﬁcient. We be-
lieve that ASIDE’s real-time, in-situ, and contextualize
support in the IDE could help developers avoid many secure
programming errors by reminding the programmer about the
issues and providing contextual explanations.
Secure programming education and training. Software devel-
oper education and training has been identiﬁed as critical to
achieve better software security. Most research work is focused
on developing educational materials and secure programming
guidelines [2–6]. However, research [13] suggests that develop-
ers’ conceptual understanding of security may be disconnected
with whether they would apply secure programming in prac-
tice. Our work addresses this gap by providing reminders in
a developers’ familiar working environment. We are also inves-
tigating the use of ASIDE in education and training by intro-
ducing ASIDE in university computing curriculum [34].
Detecting vulnerabilities using static analysis. Many static
analysis techniques have been proposed to detect injection
vulnerabilities via data ﬂow analysis [24–27]. Common
injection vulnerabilities include SQL injection, Cross-site
Scripting (XSS), Commend Injection, etc. These vulnerabilities
are caused by improper handling of untrusted input. Using
data ﬂow analysis to detect injection vulnerabilities is also
widely practiced in industry with commercial static analysis
tools.
Access control vulnerabilities stem from failure to prop-
erly check access credentials before granting access to sensi-
tive resources. Compared with injection vulnerabilities,
detection of access control vulnerabilities using staticTable 3 Interview responses of participants related to knowledge o
Participant Interview response
P4 It seems like the example (role-based access control) here, ...,
check for. But, it might be hard to apply practically [to CSRF
P7 I’ve been programming for 20 years. Basically, when you say a
And then if you say, request forgery, I don’t intuitively put tho
vulnerability] direction, probably this would have to been expa
talking about role-based access control and CSRF
P8 I can imagine it’s diﬃcult to provide contextual explanations,
example of a type of check and an example of this could be Canalysis is much less researched. A number of techniques
have been proposed to address speciﬁc types of access con-
trol models such as vulnerabilities associated with role-spe-
ciﬁc access control [28–31]. Sun et al. [28] aims to identify
role-speciﬁc access control vulnerabilities in PHP web appli-
cations. It requires the speciﬁcation of a set of pre-speciﬁed
roles from which it infers implicit access control policy by
gathering pages that could be accessed through explicit links.
It then looks for access control vulnerabilities by looking for
pages that may be accessed via forced browsing. Son et al.
[29] proposed a static analysis and code transformation ap-
proach to detect access control errors along with providing
ﬁxes automatically. It constructs an access control template
(ACT) which can be based either on user input or program
analysis. ACT is then used to ﬁnd access violations and pro-
pose ﬁxes. RoleCast [30] detects role-speciﬁc access control
vulnerabilities relying on web application conventions. It in-
fers the collection of user roles by grouping all the program
ﬁles according to statistical measurements, and then derives
the set of critical variables related to access control. It iden-
tiﬁes missing access control checks based on inconsistencies
in checking critical variables in different program contexts.
This approach only covers common database operations
(e.g. INSERTS, UPDATE, and DELET).
These approaches detect access control vulnerabilities via
some automatic program analysis techniques. Strong assump-
tions (e.g. role-based access control or SQL-based database ac-
cess) are often made for the analysis to be effective, making
them difﬁcult to apply to real-world applications which often
involve exceptions. In contrast, our approach relies on devel-
opers to provide application-speciﬁc information to help with
static analysis and does not impose any assumption on how
applications are built.
Most commercial static analysis tools, such as Fortify [8]
and Coverity [10], allow developers to write application-spe-
ciﬁc security rules for customized analysis. This process re-
quires a lot of security expertise and knowledge of the
speciﬁc security speciﬁcation languages provided by the tools.
Code annotation. Prior work on code annotation, such as
Microsoft SAL annotations [32], relies on textual extensions
of programming languages. Similarly, static analysis tools such
as Findbugs [33], Fortify [8], Coverity [10], allow the developer
to textually annotate their code to improve the accuracy of sta-
tic analysis. In many cases, requiring developers to learn addi-
tional textual languages can potentially discourage developers
from using the tool. In contrast, our approach leverages GUI
support in the IDE to solicit annotations from the developer,
which makes annotation more intuitive.f attacks.
it helped understand what access control is and what you want to
]...
ccess control to me, I think of some sort of role-base access control.
se two together... In order to get me into thinking about that [CSRF
nded a little bit so that I would have known in this context; we are
so if your example page had more examples, so if you had like one
ross-site Request Forgery
Table 4 Summary of user study.
Attacker mentality and attack knowledge
Medium Low
Programming capability
High
Understood explanatory material easily
Acknowledged the usefulness of ASIDE warnings
Used ASIDE to annotate access control checks successfully
Elaborated confusion and pointed out design requirements
Medium
Understood explanatory material easily
Acknowledged the usefulness of ASIDE warnings
Identiﬁed broken access control issues with help from experimenter
Low
Could not understand provided explanatory material;
Could not understand the purpose of ASIDE warnings;
Could not identify any broken access control issues that exist.
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The main contribution of our work is the framework of inter-
active static analysis, which integrates static analysis into the
Integrated Development Environment as a plug-in and pro-
vides in-situ security warnings to help developers detect and re-
solve vulnerabilities more easily while they are writing their
code. This approach could address 7 out of the OWASP Top
10 web application vulnerabilities. We implemented a proto-
type plug-in of our approach for Eclipse for Java, named
ASIDE. We evaluated our approach with ASIDE from multi-
ple aspects, including technical evaluation as well as user
evaluation.
Our technical evaluation of ASIDE with a popular large-
scale open source project successfully detected multiple zero-
day vulnerabilities, which demonstrates that interactive static
analysis has the capability to help developers detect vulnerabil-
ities while they are writing code. Our evaluation on the false
positives of ASIDE suggests that false positives may be limited
to a small class of use cases. Our evaluation of developer’s
annotation complexity in performing interactive code annota-
tion suggests that the annotation task is relatively easy to per-
form with most information easily reachable within the same
code block they are working on. And furthermore, our explor-
atory user evaluation suggests that while developers appreciate
ASIDE’s in-situ reminder support and become aware of secu-
rity vulnerabilities in the program being constructed, it may be
most effective for developers with adequate understanding of
secure programming.
Our evaluation results suggest that our approach has the
potential to help developers write more secure code through
in-situ reminders and interactive static analysis. Furthermore,
an interactive static analysis tool can positively impact the
implementation of a Secure Software Development Life Cycle
(SSDLC) by providing additional tool support for SSDLC.
For example, it can help enforce secure programming stan-
dards by making sure only approved input validation func-
tions are used. Information collected via interactive
annotation can be used in code reviews to make sure critical
security invariants are implemented correctly.For the future work, we plan to conduct further evaluations
of the effectiveness of interactive static analysis using larger
open source projects. We also plan to develop ways to provide
more meaningful, contextual explanations to help developers
with less experience with secure programming to effectively
use interactive static analysis.
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